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National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association v. United States Department of 
Energy, 654 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011) 
 
Emily C. Walters* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This case reviews the Department of Energy’s (hereinafter “DOE”) 
authority to promulgate energy conservation standards for electric induction 
motors.1 National Electrical Manufacturers Association (hereinafter 
“NEMA”) filed suit against the DOE in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit questioning the scope of the DOE’s authority to issue 
a final rule governing small electric induction motors up to 3 horsepower.2 
Prior to this suit, the DOE issued a final rule allowing the DOE to set 
energy conservation standards for “small electric motors” that have power 
outputs less than 3 horsepower.3 The DOE found support to set energy 
conservation standards for these power outputs of “small electric motors” 
because (1) a small electric motor is defined as a general purpose motor; (2) 
the DOE has express authority to promulgate rules for general purpose 
motors with power outputs from .25 horsepower to 3 horsepower; and 
therefore, (3) the DOE can set energy conservation standards for small 
electric motors with power outputs from .25 horsepower to 3 horsepower.4 
NEMA, however, believes the DOE overstepped its statutory authority 
because a later applicable statute limits the DOE’s authority over setting 
energy conservation standards to machines that utilize less than one 
horsepower.5 NEMA, therefore, believes the DOE’s final rule should be 
vacated in its entirety because all calculations included within the rule 
utilize the allegedly impermissible 3 horsepower limit.6  
 
II.  Background 
 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was passed by Congress to both 
increase energy efficiency and reduce the United States’ dependence on 
                                                 
 *  Class of 2013, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 497–98 (2001) 
(defining a “small electric motor”). 
 2. See id. at 497 (explaining NEMA’s petition for review of the final rule). 
 3. See id. (introducing the DOE’s rule that NEMA has petitioned for review). 
 4. See id. at 497–98 (citing the DOE’s rationale for promulgating the rule). 
 5. See id. at 503 (outlining the standard NEMA would rather see applied).  
 6. See id. (providing NEMA’s support for its belief that the rule should be vacated) . 
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foreign energy through standardizing energy management and promoting 
various alternative energy sources.7 The Act includes a uniform set of 
energy conservation standards for various products and equipment that, if 
adhered to, would trigger the Act’s system of incentives for achieving 
efficient energy management.8 This Act amends a portion of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA).9 The EPCA provided a 
directive to the Department of Energy (DOE) that it promulgate energy 
conservation standards for certain small electric motors.10 Equipment that 
contains a small electric motor can range from commercial machinery 
(which would include food processing machines, farm machinery, and 
packaging machinery) to residential machinery (including clothes washers 
and dryers, dishwashers, and air conditioners).11 These standards governing 
small electric motors must “be designed to achieve the maximum 
improvement in energy efficiency” and justified through weighing benefits 
and costs and determining their technological feasibility.12 The DOE 
contends that the standards set forth in the Final Rule “will save 
approximately 2.2 quads . . . of energy over 30 years,” which can result in 
saving about “2.2 [percent] of total annual U.S. energy consumption.”13 The 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions that would result from the passage of 
this rule would be “an amount equal to that produced by approximately 25 
million new cars in a year.”14  
A “small electric motor” is defined by the EPCA as “a NEMA general 
purpose alternative current single-speed induction motor, built in a two-
digit frame number series in accordance with NEMA Standards Publication 
MG1-1987.”15 This publication helps define “small electric motors” or 
                                                 
 7. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FEDERAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: ENERGY 
POLICY ACT OF 1992, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/regulations/epact1992.html (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2012) (providing the goals, definitions, and full text of the Energy Policy 
Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 8. See H.R. Res. 776, 102d Cong. (1992) (enacted) (providing the full text of the 
bill).  
 9.  Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 498 (2001). 
 10. See id. (providing the reason why the DOE promulgated a final rule that sets new 
energy conservation standards). 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF ENERGY CONSERVATION STANDARDS FOR 
SMALL ELECTRIC MOTORS: DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, 1, 8 (June 2003), available at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/pdfs/small_motors
_analysis.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 12. See Nat’l Elec., 654 F.3d at 498 n.3 (stating the goals for the DOE’s energy 
conservation standards). 
 13. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric 
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,876 (Mar. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431).  
 14. Id. at 10,876. 
 15. 42 USC § 6311(13)(G) (2007). 
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“machines” through several ways of classification.16 The Court, in 
particular, finds the classification by size and application as relevant to this 
case.17 A machine’s size is classified as a small, medium or large 
machine.18 “Small” machines are built in a two-digit frame number series in 
accordance with ¶ 11.01.1 of the MG1-1987 or have a frame smaller than 
that of a medium machine, “which has a continuous, open-construction 
rating at 1700-1800 rpm of 1 horsepower.”19 A machine’s application as a 
“general purpose alternating-current motor” is limited to a “maximum of 
200 horsepower and requires that they be built in an open construction.”20 
The Court also notes that machines are classified as a small motor if they 
operate at 1 horsepower versus medium motors, which operate at 1.5 
horsepower.21 Another determinative factor in finding a “general purpose 
motor” is whether it meets “prescribed performance characteristics.”22 
The DOE in 2006, as directed by the EPCA, started the process of 
establishing energy conservation standards for small electric motors.23 In 
order to establish these standards, however, the DOE first decided to 
determine “precisely which [small electric] motors are covered by this 
rulemaking.”24 The DOE, by consulting all statutory references to “small 
electric motors,” determined in 2007 that, while the MG1-1987 broadly 
defines ”small electric motors” as “encompass[ing] frame sizes 42, 48, and 
56, and motors with horsepower ratings ranging from [.25] to 3 
horsepower,” the “small electric motor” must also be a “general purpose 
motor.”25 This further delineation narrows which motors are covered by any 
DOE promulgated rules covering “small electric motors” to those “with 
horsepower ratings from 1 millihorsepower up to 1 horsepower.”26  
In 2009, the DOE issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in accordance 
with further public input, formally finding that a machine constitutes a 
“small electric motor” when it satisfies both the requisite horsepower rating 
and the type of construction (whether it was open or enclosed 
                                                 
 16. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 499 (2001) 
(discussing the various classification methods for machines).  
 17. See id. (stating that size and application are the most relevant classification 
methods because those methods directly relate to the issue of what power output range the 
DOE has authority to regulate).  
 18. Id.  
 19. See id (defining a “small” machine).  
 20. Id.  
 21. See id. at 500 (expanding on the classification of “small” two-pole motors).  
 22. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 500 (2001). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. See id. (providing the separate classification of “general purpose motor” necessary 
in order to define a motor as a “small electric motor”).  
 26. Id. at 500–01 (providing further limitations for classifying a motor as a “small 
electric motor”).  
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construction).27 While there is uncertainty within the statute as to what 
horsepower rating a small electric motor has, the proposed rule notes a 
general industry practice of considering 3 horsepower as the “upper limit 
for rated capacity of [small electric] motors.”28 There is further uncertainty 
regarding the small electric motor’s type of construction.29 An 
environmental advocacy group wanted to use the broader definition of a 
“general purpose motor” as found in later versions of MG1-1987.30 This 
broader definition would classify a machine as a small electric motor if it 
had either an open or enclosed construction.31 The notice of proposed 
rulemaking, however, decided against using later versions of MG1-1987, 
and, therefore, utilizing the original MG1-1987, the notice classifies a 
machine as a small electric motor only if it has an open construction.32  
Once the notice was issued, the DOE allowed for a public comment 
period and public meeting.33 NEMA, both through the public comment 
period and meeting, contended that some of the machines that the notice 
would constitute as small electric motors actually exceed the permissible 
horsepower limitations for small electric motors as specified by MG1-1987, 
and, therefore, the DOE was overstepping its statutory authority to 
promulgate a rule covering these machines.34 NEMA sought to avoid 
broader than necessary regulations over machinery because energy 
conservation measures impose added costs.35 Other comments reiterated the 
environmental advocacy group’s concern that the later MG1-1987 broader 
definition of general purpose motor should apply.36  
The DOE, on March 9, 2010, issued its final rule, which set “energy 
conservation standards for certain electric induction motors ranging in 
power from .25 to 3 horsepower.”37 This rule included a table of efficiency 
standards, which would change depending on the open motor’s number of 
poles.38 The DOE specifically addressed the public’s concern for 
                                                 
 27. See id. at 501 (expanding upon the necessities for classification as a “small electric 
motor”).  
 28. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 501 (2001) 
(further defining the parameters for classification).  
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. (stating Earthjustice’s contention that the DOE failed to use the most recent 
version of MG1-1987 in defining a “small electric motor”). 
 31. See id. (noting the differences between definitions of “small electric motors”). 
 32. See id. (delineating between how different versions of the MG1-1987 defined 
“small electric motors”). 
 33. Id.  
 34. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 501 (2001) 
(describing the reasoning behind NEMA’s contentions). 
 35. Id.   
 36. See id. (explaining that NEMA was not the only significant commenter). 
 37. See id. (setting forth the final rule promulgated by the DOE).  
 38. Id.; see also id. at 498 n.1 (“‘Pole configuration’ refers to the number of magnetic 
poles in an electric induction motor. The number of poles is directly related to the theoretical 
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determining which machines the DOE could regulate through this rule.39 
Specifically, the DOE finds that MG1-1987 does not specifically preclude 
the DOE from creating efficiency standards that go beyond those they were 
required to create under the EPCA.40 This is justified because these higher 
horsepower motors are commonly “marketed as general purpose motors,” 
which the DOE was directed to create energy efficiency standards for, and 
manufacturers commonly classify higher horsepower motors in their 
shipping entries as general purpose motors.41 In making these 
determinations, the DOE recognizes that no definition of a “general purpose 
motor” exists, and “will consider proposing a definition for this term in a 
future rulemaking.”42 The DOE further addressed the public concern over 
whether the DOE’s rule should also govern enclosed motors, and found that 
the original MG1-1987 definition of motor construction should apply.43 
NEMA filed suit against the DOE claiming that the DOE overstepped 
its statutory authority by promulgating a rule covering those machines that 
exceed 1 horsepower because the statutory authority of a small electric 
motor unambiguously excludes those motors exceeding 1 horsepower.44 
NEMA contends the final rule should be vacated in its entirety because all 
calculations within the rule included the allegedly impermissible higher 
horsepower.45  
 
III.  Holding 
 
The Court held that the DOE’s interpretation of “small electric motor” 
is not arbitrary or capricious and is not in excess of jurisdiction, but, rather, 
it is within the range of permissible interpretations.46 Writing for the court, 
Judge King analyzes the statute using the two-step framework of Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C. to determine the reasonableness of the agency’s 
interpretation.47 Under Chevron, the court first looks to whether Congress 
clearly addressed the precise question at issue.48 Congressional intent is 
                                                                                                                 
maximum rotational speed at which a motor can operate, as measured in revolutions per 
minute (rpm).”).  
 39. See id. at 501 (expanding upon the scope of the rule).  
 40. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 501 (2001) 
(providing an example of the scope of the rule). 
 41. See id. at 502 (explaining the example mentioned in note 40 supra).  
 42. See id. (stating the DOE’s recognition in the preamble to the final rule that there is 
currently no definition for a “general purpose motor”). 
 43. See id. at 503 (determining which definition should be applied to the rule). 
 44. See id. (providing the basis for the petition for review of the rule).  
 45.  Id. 
 46. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 503 (2001) 
(laying out the reasoning behind the court’s ruling).  
 47. Id. at 504; see also id. at 497. 
 48. See id (setting out the precedent the Court uses in its decision).  
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most clear by looking to the text, structure and grammar of the statute; 
legislative history can also be a determinative factor, but only “after 
exhausting more reliable tools of construction.”49 Once the court determines 
that Congress was silent or the statute is ambiguous (not free from doubt) 
with respect to the specific issue, the court next determines whether “the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”50 
Even if the court does not necessarily agree with the agency’s 
determination, an answer is permissible if it represents “a reasonable policy 
choice for an agency to make.”51 Courts should aim to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation, especially when it involves an area of “technical expertise” 
or “an area of rapidly changing technological and competitive 
circumstances.”52 In this case, the court first concludes that this statute was 
indeed ambiguous with regard to this particular issue.53 The court reaches 
its conclusion that the DOE’s interpretation of “small electric motor” is 
within the range of permissible interpretations when undergoing the second 
step of its Chevron analysis.54 In analyzing the language and structure of the 
statute, the Court finds that (1) the structure of the statute reveals that 
Congress purposefully broke the statute into two clauses, and the statute’s 
meaning should be mindful of this construction, (2) the language involved 
in Congress’s reference to MG1-1987 is, in fact, broader than that 
aforementioned statute, (3) even if Congress intended the statute to be 
interpreted strictly according to MG1-1987, this statute only gives a 
maximum power limitation and does not give an unambiguous range of 
powers, and (4) assuming the structure and language of the statute was not 
illuminating enough, the legislative history behind the statute does not 
support NEMA’s proposed interpretation.55  
Under the second step of a Chevron statutory analysis, the court looks 
to the structure of the statute to understand Congress’s intent.56 The 
structure reveals that Congress broke the contested sentence into two 
clauses; in order for a machine to be considered a “small electric motor,” 
two requirements, therefore, must be met: that the motor be of a “general 
purpose” and that it meet the specified frame requirements.57 The court 
                                                 
 49. See id. at 504–05 (expanding on past precedent).  
 50. Id. at 504 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)); see 
also NEMA v DOE, 654 F.3d at 505 (stating that language is ambiguous when some doubt 
remains).  
 51. Nat’l Elec., 654 F.3d at 505.  
 52. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 505 (2001). 
 53. See id. at 506 (applying Chevron to the case at hand).  
 54. See id (continuing in the application of Chevron to the rule promulgated by DOE).  
 55. See id (listing the Court’s findings). 
 56. See id. at 505 (continuing with the Court’s analysis under Chevron). 
 57. See id. at 506 (looking at the statute’s specific language, which states that “[t]he 
term ‘small electric motor’ means a NEMA general purpose alternating current single-speed 
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notes that Congress only looks to MG1-1987 with regards to frame size and 
not with regards to power output.58 Congress could have easily included 
language to limit the power output when promulgating two digit frame 
requirements, as they did when promulgating the three digit frame 
requirements, but they chose not to.59 This omission indicates that Congress 
intended for only part, and not all, of MG1-1987 to apply to “small electric 
motors.”60  
Courts, in addition to looking at the structure of the statute in question, 
also look to the particular language involved and utilize foundational 
grammatical principles of statutory interpretation.61 First, the language 
involved nearly mirrors MG1-1987’s definition of a small machine.62 MG1-
1987’s definition of a small machine “distinguishes . . . motors based on 
frame series rather than power output” unlike MG1-1987’s definition of a 
medium motor, which does in fact distinguish motors based on power 
output.63 The statute’s reference to MG1-1987, therefore, cannot be said to 
impose all the requirements of MG1-1987; it follows, then, that MG1-
1987’s one horsepower maximum cannot be said to unambiguously apply 
to the DOE’s interpretation of “small electric motor.”64 Second, the court 
applies the “last antecedent rule,” which is a grammatical principle of 
statutory construction that “holds that ordinarily a clause modifies only its 
nearest antecedent.”65 Courts generally honor an agency’s interpretation 
that conforms to this principle.66 In this case the DOE directly follows this 
rule, reasonably interpreting the statute to limit frame size but not 
necessarily power output.67 
Even if, after looking to the structure and language of the statute, the 
statute indicated that the entirety of MG1-1987 should be followed, MG1-
                                                                                                                 
induction motor, built in a two-digit frame number series in accordance with NEMA 
Standards Publication MG1-1987”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6311(13)(G) (2007)). 
 58. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 506 (2001) 
(noting the limited scope of Congress’ application of MG1-1987). 
 59.  See id. (“Indeed, Congress took this very course elsewhere in the same enactment, 
establishing statutory energy conservation standards for electric motors built in three digit 
frame series ranging from 1 to 200 horsepower.”).  
 60. See id. at 507 (determining the existence of Congressional intent behind a 
Congressional omission). 
 61. See id. at 506–07 (explaining where Courts look to determine statutory 
interpretation). 
 62. Id. at 507 (drawing comparisons between the statute and MG1-1987). 
 63. Id. at 507–08. 
 64. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 508 (2001) 
(interpreting the scope of the statute and applying it accordingly).  
 65. Id.  
 66. See id. (providing examples of the Supreme Court’s application of the last-
antecedent rule). 
 67. See id. at 508–09 (showing how DOE follows the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute). 
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1987 “limits only the maximum, and not the minimum, horsepower of 
‘general purpose alternating-current motors.”68 These machines must follow 
the additional limitation that they conform to “some standard ratings and 
operating characteristics,” but this does not specify which specific ratings 
and characteristics must be followed.69 Overall, the court does not want to 
undermine any flexibility Congress accorded to the DOE through its statute, 
nor does it want to prevent the agency from offering additional “reasonable 
alternatives”.70 The court finds the DOE’s statutory interpretation is 
reasonable, and, therefore, it defers to the agency’s interpretation of “small 
electric motor.”71  
The court finds further support for the DOE’s interpretation through the 
statute’s legislative history.72 NEMA points to one sentence in the 
legislative history that states that Congress did not intend a “small electric 
motor” to apply to machines over one horsepower.73 This sentence, 
however, is a “negative inference”; by virtue of the statute purposefully 
leaving a gap in the law purely for agency discretion, NEMA is assuming 
this one sentence should guide the agency in filling that gap.74 In the 
interest of agency deference, the court refuses to assume this negative 
inference and overturn the agency’s interpretation based on this one 
sentence.75 Furthermore, the court reprimands NEMA for taking 
inconsistent positions.76 NEMA contends that the DOE has the authority to 
promulgate rules for “small electric motors” under one horsepower, 
however, they then challenge .75 horsepower motors.77 Overall the court 
will only utilize legislative history when, after looking at the structure and 
language of the statute, the meaning remains unclear.78  
                                                 
 68. Id. at 509.  
 69. Id. 
 70. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 510 (2001) 
(explaining the reasoning behind allowing for flexibility in application of statutory 
standards). 
 71. See id. (further explaining the Court’s deference to the agency interpretation of 
“small electric motors”).  
 72. See id. (looking to the history of the statute for support).  
 73. See id. at 511 (explaining how NEMA uses legislative history to find support for 
its desire to further limit the scope of the definition of “small electric motors”).  
 74. See id. (explaining NEMA’s negative inference from a Congressional omission).  
 75. See id. (furthering agency deference by allowing agencies to fill in the gaps left by 
Congressional omissions).  
 76. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 511 (2001) 
(explaining the flaws in NEMA’s reasoning).  
 77. See id. (allowing for legislative history to only be controlling when the statute’s 
language is unclear).  
 78. See id. at 512 (“But NEMA would have us invoke the legislative history not 
merely to choose between competing interpretations not resolved by the text or canons of 
construction . . . but instead for the novel and unprecedented purpose of overriding an 
interpretation that is strongly supported by more reliable interpretive tools.”). 
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Beyond the canons of construction and legislative history, an agency 
must also interpret a statute by looking to “market realities.”79 In the 
market, general purpose motors for two digit frames are generally over one 
horsepower.80 The small and medium frame-size distinctions are 
meaningless.81 The DOE’s decision to promulgate rules for small electric 
motors that are over one horsepower, therefore, is further bolstered by 
looking to practical considerations.82  
NEMA alleges the DOE’s current interpretation is inconsistent with 
past interpretations for two reasons: 1) the DOE’s scoping document, in 
preparation to promulgating its final rule, identifies “small induction motors 
as motors with horsepower ratings from 1 millihorsepower up to 1 
horsepower,” and 2) the DOE, in response to Earthjustice, stated that 
“MG1-1987 applies to ‘all facets’ of the statutory definition.”83  
The court does not find these statements by the DOE as inconsistent 
with its current statutory interpretation.84 First, this language in the scoping 
document refers to “certain tables found in MG1-1987, and is not a 
conclusive (or even preliminary) pronouncement on the import of those 
tables for the meaning of the statutory definition.”85 Similarly, the “all 
facets” language was referring to a separate question about whether the 
DOE was statutorily permitted to promulgate rules over enclosed and open 
motors; it was not in reference to the horsepower ratings at question here.86  
The court, overall, believes that according to statutory canons of 
construction, the legislative history, practical realities, and a consistent 
interpretation position throughout the rulemaking process, the DOE has 
reasonably interpreted “small electric motors” to include machines with 
horsepower ratings over one horsepower.87  
 
 
                                                 
 79. See id (explaining that statutes may only be applied where they are reasonably 
applicable in the market).  
 80. Id.  
 81. See id. at 513 (explaining that classification by size is mostly useless when looking 
at the market).  
 82. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 513 (2001) 
(explaining the importance of practical application).  
 83. Id.  
 84. See id. at 514 (finding that DOE’s application was consistent with the statute). 
 85. Id.  
 86. See id. (separating out the “all facets” language from the horsepower discussion).  
 87. Id. (“[I]t is enough that the Final Rule and the accompanying explanation set forth 
a coherent interpretation and a plausible rationale underpinning it.”); see also Ala. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Conservation .v EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004) (“Even when an agency explains its 
decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’ a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that 
account if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 
(1974))). 
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IV.  Dissent 
 
Judge Shedd in the dissent believes the DOE’s interpretation set forth in 
its final rule is “contrary to the statute and Congress’s clear direction.”88 
According to the House Report, which accompanied the act, the DOE was 
only given discretion to promulgate rules over electric motors of less than 
one horsepower.89 An interpretation of “small electric motors” therefore is 
necessary; if this act was referring to small electric motors, then the DOE is 
limited to promulgating rules which affect only motors under one 
horsepower.90  
The dissent notes that the entirety of MG1-1987 should be applied to 
the definition of small electric motors because both NEMA and the DOE 
have done so throughout the rulemaking process.91 It is not appropriate to 
emphasize the fact that Congress split the statement into two clauses 
because statutes should “be read as a whole.”92 In fact, the phrase “general 
purpose alternating current motor” is “lifted verbatim from Section 1.05 of 
MG1-1987 (which section DOE and the majority would at least partially 
apply).”93 It is only appropriate, therefore, to interpret “small electric 
motor” according to the entirety of MG1-1987; in looking at MG1-1987 it 
is clear that the DOE is only given authority to promulgate rules for 
machines with less than one horsepower rating.94 
Finally, the dissent contests the finding that the sentence in the 
legislative history, which states that the DOE is limited to promulgating 
rules for machines under one horsepower, actually contains an 
impermissible negative inference.95 No inferences or assumptions are being 
made, but rather NEMA was relying on a “positive statement of what 
Congress intended” that the DOE’s regulatory authority only covers motors 
that are less than one horsepower.96 Overall, by neglecting the horsepower 
limitation, the dissent believes this decision will grant the DOE unlimited 
                                                 
 88. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 516 (2001).  
 89. Id.; see also id.at 519 (“The House Report language is important because it 
explains what the statutory language at issue meant to the members of Congress who had 
expertise over these matters.”).  
 90. See id. at 516 (believing that the limitations of the statute are consistent with 
NEPMA’s propositions).  
 91. See id (explaining the dissent’s reasoning).  
 92. Id. at 517 (citing U.S. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135, 127 S.Ct. 
2331, 168 L.Ed.2d 28 (2007)).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 517–18 (2001) 
(stating that MG1-1987 defines small electric motors more fully through various factors, 
ratings, and operating characteristics). 
 95. See id. at 519 (supporting the idea that the sentence from the legislative history 
allows for a negative inference). 
 96. Id. 
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authority against Congress’s clear wishes that the DOE be limited to 
horsepower ratings.97 
 
V.  Future Implications 
 
The Fourth Circuit applied a typical Chevron analysis to determine if 
the DOE properly interpreted the scope of its authority in promulgating 
energy conservation standards.98 In applying a traditional Chevron analysis, 
the court looked at both the language of the statute and the legislative 
history, and found that the traditional canons of construction support the 
DOE’s interpretation of the “small electric motor.”99 The court also looked 
to the practical, everyday use of the phrase and found that industries 
generally regard motors with a power output higher than one horsepower as 
“small electric motors;” again, this finding supports the DOE’s 
interpretation of the phrase “small electric motor.”100 In order to fulfill the 
purpose of the EPCA’s energy conservation directive, the court agrees with 
the DOE’s contention that it has the authority to set energy conservation 
standards for “small electric motors” with a power output up to 3 
horsepower.101  
Though the effects of NEMA v. DOE are still being determined, the 
court’s analysis of the statute supports the recent movement toward 
increased energy conservation. The EPCA recognizes that energy efficiency 
often imposes an economic burden to some projects.102 This burden, 
however, is one out of many start-up costs associated with the decision to 
undergo a project; and therefore, these projects can, at a minimum, take 
energy efficiency costs into account before deciding to begin a particular 
project.103  
Justice Shedd’s dissent underscores the importance of taking the 
entirety of MG1-1987 into account when interpreting the phrase “small 
electric motor.” His comprehensive statutory approach may afford a more 
accurate interpretation of the “small electric motor,” however, this 
particular method of interpretation is not the specific issue before the court, 
and therefore would be inappropriate to adopt. The court is specifically 
                                                 
 97. See id. at 520 (finding that the majority’s holding was adverse to the intentions of 
Congress).  
 98.  See id. at 504 (using Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, to evaluate the parties’ 
arguments). 
 99.  See id. (applying the Chevron test to the present case). 
 100.  See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 500 (2001) 
(laying out the maximum horsepower of a “small electric motor”). 
 101.  See id. (providing the separate classification of “general purpose motor” necessary 
in order to define a motor as a “small electric motor”). 
 102. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Energy and Power Sources § 99 (2011). 
 103.  Id. 
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charged with determining if the agency provided a reasonable explanation 
for interpreting the statute in a particular way; this standard of review does 
not allow the court to overrule an interpretation because the court does not 
agree with an agency’s stated reasons for adopting a particular 
interpretation. As long as the agency reasonably interpreted the statute 
based on traditional statutory canons of construction, the court should not 
overrule the agency’s interpretation. Overall, the DOE’s proposed scope of 
authority over energy conservation is a reasonable interpretation of a 
technical statute that fulfills the purpose of the EPCA to promote increased 
energy efficiency.  
